Negative Eventualities as First-Class Linguistic Entities
It is occasionally questioned whether negated clauses, negated gerundial phrases, etc., can assert existence of eventualities, i.e., whether negative eventualities (NEs) exist. In this part, I will first present various arguments, most collected from the literature, other new, fo r the claim that NEs should be accepted as first-class semantic entities, and then I will consider possible objections to this stance.
Arguments fo r the Existence of Negative Eventualities
The arguments fo r the existence of NEs below are given roughly in the increasing order of strength.
Anaphoric Reference
The first argument fo r NEs, adduced, e.g., by de Swart 1996, comes from the possibility of anaphoric reference to entities introduced by negated clauses:
(1)
John did not ask Mary to dance at the party. It made her angry.
( 2 ) (4)
He is a brute. His behaviour shows this quite clearly.
Thus, (1)-(2) constitute evidence fo r negative eventualities only insofar as only eventualities, not propositions or fa cts, can enter causative relations and can last fo r a period of time (see below) .
Nominal Reference
Higginbotham 1996a, p.4S, cites the fo llowing data as providing evidence fo r NEs:
(S) the non-explosion of the gases (6) the non-rising of the sun However, it is not immediately clear that whatever such phrases refer to are eventualities. Since Vendler 1967 and Davidson 1980 , it is uncontroversial that deverbal nominals may refer to eventualities and other abstract entities such as propositions. It is much less clear, though, what kinds of deverbal nominals can refer to what kinds of abstract entities.
In order to construct an argument fo r negative eventualities, one needs to find a class of deverbal nominals which can be used exclusively to refer to eventualities, and show that such nominals can be negated.
Asher 1993, § 1.1, adopts the fo llowing fine-grained taxonomy of deverbal nominal phrases in English:
• ACC-ing gerund phrases, e.g., Fred singing the Marseille;
• POSS-ing gerund phrases, e.g., Fred's giving the book to Mary;
• of-ing gerund phrases, e.g., the mayor's throwing of the pizza in the guest of honour's fa ce;
• derived nominal phrases, e.g., Caesar's destruction of Carthage .
As discussed by Asher 1993 , propositional contexts (see endnote 1) may take certain derived nominals, but not of-ing or POSS-ing gerunds, while fa ctual contexts can take POSS-ing gerunds and perhaps also ACC-ing gerunds, but apparently not of-ing gerunds. So, if there is a class of deverbal nominals referring exclusively to eventualities, it is the class of of-ing gerunds.
Unfortunately, of-blg gerunds are morphosyntactically nominal rather than verbal categories (this is shown by the obligatoriness of of) and so they cannot combine with not:
*the not exploding of the gasesOn the other hand, as (6) above shows, of-ing gerunds can be modified by nOll, but since this possibility is restricted and often fe lt by native speakers as marked, it seems that such examples provide only suggestive evidence fo r NEs. 2
Causation
It is a standard assumption that only event(ualitie)s can be causes and effects (Davidson 1980 , Thompson 1977 , Rosner 1986 , Parsons 1990 , Higginbotham 1996a . If so, then examples below provide evidence fo r NEs: ..
(8) I kept the child awake by not turning out the light. (Higginbotham 1996a) (9) He didn't stop at the lights because he didn't notice them.
This standard assumption has, however, been questioned by Asher 1993, who notes (p.29) that "facts appear to have causal efficacy" :
The fa ct that John had a headache made him crabby.
John's crabbiness resulted in the fa ct that everyone avoided him.
Evidence to the similar effect can be fo und in Parsons 1990, p.160: (12) John's rude answering of the phone was caused by his fight with his wife.
_
The fa ct that John answered in a rude manner was caused by ... (8)- (9) eventually is.
Modification by Relative Clauses
An argument similar to that provided by anaphoric reference, but stronger, as we will presently see, comes fr om the possibility of an eventuality to be modified by a relative clause. Assuming that eventualities, but not propositions, may enter causal relations (see above), that propositions, but not eventualities, may occur in the X is true context, and that show X is a fa ctual context (Asher 1993) , (13 )- (15) show that which may refer to eventualities, but not to propositions or fa cts:
John kissed Mary, which made her angry.
*John kissed Mary, which is true.
*John kissed Mary, which is shown by her blushed fa ce.
A straightforward analysis of this fa ct in terms of event semantics is that which represents the event variable introduced by the modified clause. If so, negated clauses also introduce event variables:
John didn't ask Mary to dance at the party, which made her angry.
Perceptual Reports

�
According to various papers by James Higginbotham (e.g., Higginbotham 1983 (27) Mary smiled at John. He didn't smile back.
This argument is interesting because it shows that negated sentences may actually express events, not just states or processes, as occasionally claimed (see § 1.2). 4
Answer to What happened?
Since only event( ualitie )s, not other kinds of abstract entities, may happen, data � such as (28) below, fr om de Swart 1996, provide strong evidence fo r the existence ofNEs.
(28) What happened next was that the consulate didn't give us our visa.
Argument of take place
Finally, it is a standard assumption that subjects of occur, take place, etc., must be eventualities. Although, in English, this position cannot be easily occupied by a negated gerundial phrase, many native speakers accept (29), and also Polish (30) is impeccable. (29) His not fulfilling the duties of his position took place over a six-month period in 1983. (30) Niedopelnienie obowi�zk6w sluzbowych przez Kowalskiego mialo miejsce not-fulfilment-PERF duties professional by Kowalski had place w roku 1983. in year 1983 'Kowalski's not fulfilling his professional duties took place in 1983.' Summary I have shown that there is enough evidence, some of it very strong, to conclude that negated clauses, gerundives, etc., assert the existence of eventualities, just as their non-negated counterparts do. In the remainder of this part, I'll try to address some questions brought fo rth by this conclusion.
Additional Ma tters
Restricted Modification Possibilities
One possible objection to the existence of NEs might be that they cannot be easily modified:
(3) *John slowly didn't butter a piece of toast. (32) *[John didn't butter a piece of toast] with a knife.
Recall that inference patterns shown by such modified clauses played a crucial role in establishing events as first-class linguistic entities (Davidson 1980) . Although I have nothing to say about the reasons of unacceptability of (3 1 )-(32), I believe that this inability of NEs to be modified by manner, instrumental, etc., adverbials does not weaken our conclusion.
First of all, there are other classes of well-established eventualities wh ich Moreover, when NEs events can be modified, this leads to the same inference patterns as those discussed in Davidson 1980 as an argument fo r his underlying quantification over events analysis.
Thus, I conclude that the restricted modification possibilities displayed by NEs should not be held against them.
Are There Negative Events?
Can NEs be events, or are there only negative states? The popular view is that, to the extent that negated clauses assert the existence of an eventuality at all, they may assert only the existence of states, or-more generally-duratives, i.e., states or processes; see, e.g., Moens 1987 , Asher 1993 , Verkuyl 1993 , de Swart 1996 , de Swart and Molendijk 1998 However, there is a growing body of evidence that NEs may also be events. One argument, provided by de Swart and Molendijk 1998, is that negated clauses may move fo rward reference time in discourse, which is a sign that they may introduce events, see (27) above (and endnote 4). Another argument is that negated clauses may occur in the context What happened (n ext) was X, see the contrast between (28) above and (36) below.
(36) *What happened next was that John loved Mary / that John was running.
Moreover, if the perfe ctive vs. imperfe ctive grammatical distinction in Polish reflects the event vs. durative semantic dichotomy (as it seems to do), then the negated gerunds in (2 1a), (30), (34) and (35) 
Metaphysical Status of Negative Eventualities
Once we accept NEs as first-class linguistic objects, the question arises whether they belong only to natural language metaphysics, or also to real world metaphysics (Bach' 1981 , Asher 1993 .
One case where language makes a distinction apparently not reflected in the real world is aspect: the same real world event may be described as belonging to different aspectual classes, e.g., Peter was do ing the washing up vs. Peter washed the dishes (Asher 1993) , or eating a pint of ice cream vs. eating ice cream (Krifka 1992). Another example may be buying and selling. As discussed by Parsons 1990, p.84 , these verbs, when used fo r describing the same situation, refer to two different events within the natural language metaphysics; this is because, e.g., the sentence Kim bought the tricycle fr om Sheehan with his (K im ' s) Ma sterCard does not say the same as Sheehan sold the tricycle to Kim with his (K im ' s) Ma sterCard. And yet, it makes sense to say that two different natural language events, described with buy or with sell, are mapped to the same real world event.
All the arguments fo r NEs given above are arguments fo r NEs qua citizens of natural language metaphysics. I see no arguments fo r positing a separate real world category of negative eventualities.
Negative Eventualities and Negative Concord
The previous section established the existence of negative eventualities, states as well as events. In this and the fo llowing section, I will present some evidence that NEs play an important role in the grammar, namely, that they take part in Negative Concord and that they bear on the ambiguity of negated polar interrogatives.
By Negative Concord (NC), I mean a phenomenon consisting in two or � more negative constituents jointly expressing a single negation meaning, where a negative constituent is a constituent which may (alone) express (sentential) negation. (Note that NC is different from NPI-licensing; NPls do not alone express sentential negation.) For example, in Polish, nie 'not' and niktlnikomu 'nobody-NOMIDAT' are negative constituents, as shown in (40)- (42). (43) shows that their coocurrence leads to a single negati � n meaning.
(40) Janek nie pom6g1 Tomkowi.
John-NOM not helped Tom-DAT 'John didn't help Tom.' (4 1) Kto pom6g1 Tomkowi? Nikt.
who-NOM helped Tom-DAT nobody-NOM 'Who helped Tom? Nobody. ' (42) Komu pom6g1 Janek? Nikomu.
whom-DAT helped John-NOM nobody-DAT 'Whom did John help? Nobody.' (43) Nikt *(nie) pom6g1 nikomu.
nobody-NOM not helped nobody-DAT 'Nobody helped anybody.'
Negative pronouns such as nikt, nigdy 'never', etc., are called n-words (Laka 1990 ). The main question that analyses ofNC try to answer is what licenses n-words. There are two main classes of approaches:
• syntactic approaches, e.g., Progovac 1988 Progovac , 1994 (n-words as anaphors), Laka 1990 , Zanuttini 1991 , Haegeman and Zanuttini 1991 , Haegeman 1995 (n-words licensed by an operator in / the head of the LP / NegP), Przepi6rkowski and Kupsc 1997a,b,c (n-words licensed long-distance by a morphosyntactic fe ature);
• entailment approaches (extending Ladusaw's 1980 work on NPls), e.g., Progovac 1993 , van der Wouden and Zwarts 1993 , van der Wouden 1994 , Dowty 1994 (downward / upward entailment, antimorphicity, anti additivity), Giannakidou 1997 Giannakidou , 1998 .
Below, I will present some arguments fo r a different kind of approach, i.e.:
• eventuality approaches: Tovena 1996a,b (sentential negation and n-word jointly negate the existence of an event), Przepi6rkowski 1999 and Przepi6rkowski and Kupsc 1999 (n-words licensed by NEs).
In Polish, n-words are licensed when they are eventuality-level dependents, or are within such dependents (subject to additional syntactic constraints; see 
SG.MASC this thanks nobody-DAT 'I haven't done this thanks to anybody. ' (putative)
(48) is particularly interesting here because it shows that the licensing fa ctor is not simply the scope of negation; as (49) below shows, the position occupied by nikomu in (48) may be in the scope of negation, and yet (48) is ungrammatical. Thus, the data in (48)-(49) posit a real challenge fo r those theories which link licensing of n-words to the scope of a negative operator, and, on the other hand, support the eventuality-level approach.
(49) Nie zrobilem tego dzi�ki Jankowi, tylko dzi�ki Tomkowi.
not did-1.SG.MASC this thanks John-DAT only thanks Tom-DAT 'I haven't done this thanks to John, only thanks to Tom.'
Another argument fo r our claim that NEs may play the licensing role in NC will be given in the next section.
Negative Eventualities and Negated Yes/No Interrogatives
Ambiguity of Negated YeslNo In terrogatives
According to the standard answer-theoretic view (dating back to Hamblin 195 8) , the semantics of negated yes/no interrogatives is the same as the semantics of their non-negated counterparts; see Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997 (and references therein) fo r a recent reappraisal. Any apparent differences are relegated to pragmatics. Here, I would like to challenge this view on the basis of the observation that a robust ambiguity of negated yes/n o interrogatives is reported fo r � various languages, and that this ambiguity bears on Negative Concord, a syntactico-semantic, not pragmatic, phenomenon.
The relevant ambiguity in German is discussed (in pragmatic terms) by Meibauer 1990 , who gives the fo llowing example. 5 (50) Ich fr age mich, ob Fritz (wirklich) nicht kommt.
I ask myself if Fritz (really) not comes .
'I wonder whether Fritz is coming. ' 'I wonder whether Fritz is (really) not coming.'
On one reading, negation is neutralized, as answer-theoretic theories predict, but on the other reading, fo rced by adding wirklich 'really' or by putting some stress on nicht 'not', the question is understood as asking fo r confirmation of an occurrence of a negative eventuality. It Italian, as is well known, sentential negation may be expressed either by the negative marker non, or by a pre-verbal n-word. Interestingly, both lead to ambiguity in polar interrogatives, which suggests that this is a general property of sentential negation, and not of, say, a lexical item (see Przepi6rkowski 1999) .
(51) Voleva sapere se nessuno ha telefonato.
wanted-3 . SG know if nobody AUX phoned '(S)he wanted to know whether anybody phoned.' '(S)he wanted to know whether nobody phoned.' (52) Voleva sapere se Mario (veramente) non ha telefonato.
wanted-3 .SG know if Mario (really) not AUX phoned '(S)he wanted to know whether Mario had phoned.' '(S)he wanted to know whether Mario (really) hadn't phoned.'
Again, just as in German, a negated yes/n o interrogative may mean, roughly, either is(n 't) it the case that p?, in which negation is neutralized, or is it the case that not p? fo rced, again as in German, by adding 'really' or by putting some stress on the negative element. Further, the same ambiguity surfaces in Slavic languages; but here the situation is even more interesting because n-words may occur in negated yes/n o interrogatives only on the 'confi rmation of the occurrence of a NE' reading, not on the 'neutralized negation' reading; see the Serbo-Croatian data (drawn fr om Progovac 1994 and Brown and Franks 1995) below, in which zar 'really' disambiguates the question (again !) to the fo rmer reading, and the complementizer da seems to fo rce the latter reading, as the (original) glosses show.
(53) Zar ne zna ni(t)ko od vas kako se to radi?
really not know nobody of you how Refl this does 'Can it be that none of you know how this is done?' (54) Da ne zna *ni(t)ko / i(t)ko od vas kako se to radi? Comp not know nobody / anybody of you how Refl this does 'Does any one of you know how this is done?'
As (53)- (54) show, only on the negative eventuality reading is the n-word ni(t) ko allowed; on the other reading, the NPI i(t)ko must be used instead. This contrast seems to confirm in an interesting way the claim of the previous section, i.e., that NEs may license n-words in NC languages. Moreover, such interaction ofNC and polar interrogatives seems to pose a serious challenge fo r entailment-based approaches to NC, because of the ill-understood (and controversial) nature of entailment properties of questions (as opposed to entailment of propositions). Similar data, leading to similar conclusions, are knO\\l1 fo r Russian (see Brown and Franks 1995 fo r an extensive discussion and fo r a syntactic GB analysis) and fo r Polish (see Przepiorkowski and Kupsc 1999 fo r an HPSG analysis semantically compatible with present considerations).
Interestingly, the same contrast is also present in Italian, although in a slightly concealed way. In this language, n-words are licensed not only by negation, but also by questionhood and other environments, so it is not clear what exactly licenses nessuno in (5 1). However, as noted by Zanuttini 1991, as soon as an n-word is modified by quasi 'almost', it may be licensed only by negation (or negative eventuality, if our claim is right). This means that adding quasi to (5 1) should make the 'neutralized negation' reading unavailable. This prediction is confirmed:
(55) Voleva sapere se quasi nessuno ha telefonato.
wanted-3 . SG know if almost nobody AUX phoned *'(S)he wanted to know whether almost anybody phoned.' ?'(S)he wanted to know whether almost nobody phoned. ,6
This interaction of NC with the ambiguity of negated yes 110 interrogatives strongly suggest that this ambiguity is not just some ephemeral pragmatic effect; in Slavic, as well as in Italian, Negative Concord is always analysed as a (syntactico )semantic phenomenon, apparently unaffected by pragmatics.
A Situation Semantics Analysis 7
Since the aim of this section is to sketch a Situation Semantics analysis of the ambiguity of negated yes/n o interrogatives, and the intuition we want to capture is that one of the readings involves a NE, we should first decide what Situation Semantic constructs correspond to our intuition of eventualities. Although Barwise and Perry 1983 seem to equate events and situations, there are actually at least fo ur possibilities, reflecting different views on whether eventualities are atomic or cumulative, and whether they are abstract linguistic (theoretic) entities, or real world objects:
• cumulative and real world --7 situations;
• cumulative and abstract --7 infons;
• atomic and real world � minimal/atomic situations (Moore 1993);
• atomic and abstract � basic infons. Since I am concerned here with eventualities as atomic and abstract objects, I will ... assume that, in Situation Semantics, they are represented by basic infons. Now, my claim is that the observed ambiguity of negation in yes/n o questions is a reflex of a more general ambiguity of negation assumed within Situation Semantics (see, especially, Etchemendy 1987, and Cooper 1997) . More specifically, assuming that (56) is a representation of John saw Mary (see Devlin 1991 fo r notation and fo r treating the . 'support' relation '1=' on par with other relations), then (57)- (58) I extend the notation of (56)- (58) to questions (compare Ginzburg 1992 Ginzburg , 1995 and assume that ( Now, given these representations, natural questions that arise are: Why is propositional negation neutralized in yes/no interrogatives?, and, a more general question, Why does the ambiguity of sentential negation surface in interrogatives, but not in declaratives?
The answer to the first question is standard: assuming the answer-theoretic approach to questions, the meaning of (61), involving propositional negation, is the same as the meaning of (59), i.e., the set of possible answers {'Situation s supports « see, J, M; + »' , 'Situation s does not support « see, J, M; + » '}. Of course, this identity of meanings (qua possible answers) does not carry over to (60), whose answer-theoretical meaning is different, namely, {'Situation s supports « see, J, M; -»' , 'Situation s does not support « see, J, M; -» '}.
The second question is less trivial. We will first answer the second part of this question (i.e., Why does the ambiguity of sentential negation not surface in declaratives?), and then the first part (Why does it surface in yes/n o interrogatives?).
. Note first that (57) and (58) (57) and (58) are normally synonymous, by the way we talk about situations. If so, why then does the ambiguity of negation surface in polar interrogative clauses at all? Relative completeness of every-day situations would imply that the two meanings of (60)-(6 1) are also equivalent. I believe that this conclusion is actually true, i.e., that negated yes/n o interrogatives are ambiguous, but the two meanings are truth-conditionally equivalent. 9 This actually reflects the intuitions of native speakers, who-when fa ced with negated yes/n o interrogatives as those in §3 . I.-usually report that these interrogatives are ambiguous between a 'positive' reading, the same as that of the corresponding positive interrogative, and a 'negative' reading, which licenses n-words, but they are at loss when asked to pinpoint the difference. 
Summary
Here are the main results of this paper: 1) negated clauses, negated deverbal nominals, etc., may express eventualities, states as well as events, just as their non-negated counterparts do; in other words, negative eventualities exist; 2) negative eventualities seem to play an important role in the grammar:
• they play the licensing role in Negative Concord;
• negated interrogatives are visibly ambiguous, with one of the readings involving negative eventualities;
3)
a rather natural analysis of this ambiguity may be fo rmulated within Situation Semantics. I realize that the results of this paper open many new questions, including those about the exact properties of NEs, and about the place of eventualities in Situation Semantics. I would like to hope that this paper will stimulate future research on these issues. Since the publisher of these proceedings does not accept LaTeX or PostScript, this paper had to be fo rmatted in an inferior word processor, i.e., Word fo r Windows. I take only partial responsibility fo r the final typesetting.
1
Contexts such as X is true and believe X are propositional contexts, while indicate X and show X are supposed to be fa ctual contexts; see Asher 1993 fo r details.
2
Of course, NEs can be referred to also by other kinds of deverbal nominals, cf. the attested Polish example below and its English translation.
(i)
Wczorajsze niepodpisanie ustawy przez prezydenta bylo wydarzeniem, yesterday-ADJ not-signing-PERF bill by president was event kt6re zdominowalo wiadomosci dnia. which dominated news day '[[The president's not signing the bill] yesterday] was an event which dominated the day's news.'
That the negated nominal in this particular case refers to an eventuality is suggested by the fa ct that it is temporally modified (see the main text), and perhaps also by the use of wydarzeniem 'event'. The point I am making is that such deverbal nominals can also be used to refer to other kinds of abstract entities, so the sheer possibility of negating them does not yet constitute evidence fo r NEs.
3
Note, however, that Asher 1993 distinguishes semantic arguments of perception verbs, which he calls (after Barwise and Perry 1983) situations, fr om eventualities.
4
According to de Swart and Molendijk 1998, negated sentences may express negative events only indirectly, i.e., these negative events are coerced fr om negative states via a general state-to-event coercion mechanism (see de Swart 1998).
5
See also Borillo 1979 on French, not discussed here fo r lack of space.
6
The question mark in fr ont of this reading means that, although some speakers find the sentence fully acceptable on this reading (and, hence, the contrast between the readings clear), others consider it not fully acceptable (but clearly better than the other reading), while some find neither reading acceptable.
7
For space reasons, I have to be concise here, so this section presupposes some knowledge of Situation Semantics (e.g., Devlin 1991).
8
Barwise and Etchemendy 1987 call propositional negation 'denial', and Cooper 1997 calls eventuality negation 'infonic negation'.
9
Of course, saying that there is a semantic non-truth-conditional ambiguity makes sense only in a theory that goes beyond truth conditions in search fo r meaning, such as Situation Semantics.
10
See also Przepi6rkowski 1999 and Przepi6rkowski and Kupsc 1999 fo r a syntactico-semantic analysis of Negative Concord in Italian and In Polish, embedding the analysis of negated yes/no interrogatives presented here.
